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one	 in	 the	west,	 the	other	 in	 the	east.	The	western	 identity,	












raise	 separatist	 slogans	 only	 exceptionally.	 Claims	 about	
















sabotaging	 the	Maidan,	but	 there	 is	no	political	programme	
behind	them.	
•	 It	 is	 quite	 likely	 that	 most	 of	 those	 claims	 are	 inspired	 by,	
or	come	from,	 the	Russian	Federation,	and	that	 they	are	ad-
dressed	to	Western	public	opinion,	which	has	been	uncritical	
of	 reports	of	an	 impending	 ‘division	of	Ukraine’.	From	Mos-




























































internal	 diversity,	 and	 will	 then	 show	 how	 this	 diversity	 has	
changed	over	time	as	a	result	of	the	emergence	and	existence	of	




















































incorporated	 into	 the	 European	 civilizational	 space	 only	 in	 the	
late	eighteenth	century.	The	second	most	important	dividing	line	





Those	 historical	 divisions	 are	 reflected	 in	Ukraine’s	 ethnic	 and	
religious	splits.	Rural	areas	in	most	of	Ukraine	are	inhabited	by	
ethnic	Ukrainians.	Large	Russian	communities	exist	only	in	the	
southern	oblasts	 and	 the	Donetsk	Basin,	but	 substantial	 groups	
of	Russians	 also	 live	 in	Ukraine’s	major	 cities,	 especially	 in	 the	
eastern	and	southern	parts	of	the	country.	In	the	east,	substan-
tial	swathes	of	the	society	do	not	profess	any	ethnic	 identity,	as	




















The	 fact	 that	 some	 regions	 were	 subjected	 to	 Sovietisation	 for	
longer	than	others	is	also	reflected	in	the	deep	ideological	and	po-
litical	divisions	in	Ukraine:	the	western	oblasts	(as	well	as	Kyiv,	
which	 is	 home	 to	 huge	 numbers	 of	migrants	 from	 the	western	




















peninsula	 attracted	 at	 least	 30,000	 job	migrants	 from	Belarus,2	
then	 there	must	 have	 been	 a	 considerable	 proportion	 of	 people	
1	 For	more	information	see	Tadeusz	A.	Olszański,	Kresy	zachodnie.	Miejsce	


















dustrial	 centres	 in	 droves	 among	 the	 500,000	 Ukrainians	 who	
migrated	 to	 the	 peninsula.	 Kyiv’s	 demographic	 continuity	 was	
effectively	interrupted	by	the	last	war,	and	the	city’s	current	in-
habitants	 hail	 from	places	 throughout	Ukraine	 (as	well	 as	Rus-
sia	and	other	Soviet	republics).	That	is	because,	as	the	capital	of	
an	independent	state,	the	city	has	been	an	attractive	destination	
for	 large	 numbers	 of	 intellectuals	 and	 entrepreneurs	 from	 the	
entire	country.	Finally,	all	regions	of	Ukraine,	and	the	cities	and	

































































II. the factorS of ukraIne’S new unIty
In	Ukraine,	as	in	the	other	post-communist	states,	two	new,	very	
deep	 and	 significant	 splits	 have	 emerged	 over	 the	 last	 twenty	
years:	the	social	divide,	and	the	generational	divide.	The	former	
has	 replaced	 the	 relative	 homogeneity	 of	 the	 Soviet	 society,	 in	
which	the	vast	majority	of	people	were	employees	of	state-owned	
entities	(offices,	public	services	and	enterprises),	with	a	plurality	













ed	to	 the	 fact	 that	Ukraine	has	been	an	 independent	state	since	
1991.	This	means	that	its	citizens	who	started	school	in	that	year	




numbered	 around	 7	million	 in	 2013,	 accounting	 for	 over	 15%	 of	
the	 country’s	 population.	 Those	 among	 them	 who	 have	 better	
education	have	been	the	main	force	behind	the	present	protests,	
5	 Cf.	Anders	Aslund,	‘Comparative	Oligarchy:	Russia,	Ukraine	and	the	United	


















The	modernisation	processes	 taking	place	 in	Ukraine	have	 also	
thinned	 out	 the	 differences	 between	 regions.	 This	 particular-













form.	 They	 not	 only	 read	 Shevchenko’s	 poetry,	 but	 are	 also	 ex-
posed	to	the	belief	that	he	was	the	poet-prophet,	‘our	everything’,	
the	alpha	and	omega	of	national	 culture.	They	 study	 the	heroic	
(but	also	anarchist)	tradition	of	the	Cossacks,	and	absorb	the	nar-








6	 Titushki is	 a	 term	 that	 refers	 to	 young	 people	 from	 working	 class	 back-
grounds,	often	hooligans,	recruited	by	the	security	services	to	disrupt	dem-























country’s	 centre	 and	 its	 unity.	 They	 are	 reinforced	 by	 the	 sig-
nificance	attached	in	the	learning	of	national	history	to	the	two	
events	which	 integrated	 all	 the	 regions:	 the	Holodomor	 and	 the	












from	 there.	 Chyhyryn	was	 the	 capital	 of	 Bohdan	Khmelnytsky’s	 Cossack	
state.	 Kholodnyi	 Yar	 is	 a	 forest	 range	 near	 Chyhyryn,	 a	 hideaway	 of	 the	
Haidamaky	 and	 the	 insurgents	of	 1918–1922,	 and	finally	Khortytsia	 (today	
part	of	the	city	of	Zaporizhia,	550	km	from	Kyiv	down	the	Dnieper	river)	was	
the	main	seat	of	the	Zaporizhian	Sich.	

























The	 continued	 existence	 and	 consolidation	 of	 the	 formal	 struc-
tures	of	the	state	has	also	had	a	stabilising	effect	on	the	unity	and	
indivisibility	 of	Ukraine.	 The	Ukrainian	 bureaucracy	 (the	 state	
apparatus	 in	 the	broad	sense),	which	existed	as	an	autonomous	
subsystem	 even	 before	 1991,	 quickly	 transformed	 into	 an	 inde-
pendent,	 closed	 system,	 developing	 its	 own	 patterns	 of	 action	
and	 hierarchic	 structures	 (it	 is	 irrelevant	 here	 that	 they	 were	
often	archaic	and	criminally	pathogenic).	Its	group	interests	are	
linked	with	 the	 state,	which	 is	 the	 source	 of	 status,	 prosperity	
and	power.	The	bureaucracy	is	uninterested	in	undermining	the	





system	of	government	has	contributed	 to	 the	country’s	unity	 in	
one	more	way:	by	attracting	 large	numbers	of	members	of	 local	
business	 and	 intellectual	 elites	 to	 the	 capital,	 and	 in	 this	 way	







Strong	 regional	 identifications	 in	 Ukraine	 (mainly	 in	 Donbas,	
Kharkiv	and	Odessa,	and	also	in	Transcarpathia)	have	the	nature	
10	 Kharkiv,	Ukraine’s	second	largest	city,	was	the	capital	of	the	Ukrainian	SSR	
in	 the	years	 1917–1934.	 It	 is	 an	 important	 industrial	 and	academic	 centre,	
and	its	inhabitants	retain	a	strong	sense	of	local	identity	(it	is	still	common	
there	to	refer	to	Kharkiv	as	the	‘first	capital’).	On	the	other	hand,	the	fact	
that	 the	Kharkiv	elites	 (unlike	 those	of	Lviv,	Dnipropetrovsk	or	Donetsk)	



















nority	which	 is	 very	 large,	 considering	 the	 scale	 of	 the	 region,	
and	is	also	seeing	the	development	of	a	political	concept	of	a	local	























III. the dIScourSe of ‘two ukraIneS’







of	Ukraine’s	 internal	 divisions,	 and	who	denies	 the	 inhabitants	
of	most	of	 the	eastern	part	of	 the	country	 the	right	 to	be	called	
Ukrainians,	calling	them	Creoles	instead.12	Ukraine’s	most	distin-
guished	historian	 of	 the	middle	 generation,	Yaroslav	Hrytsak,13	
















































sense	of	pride	of	 the	 inhabitants	of	 “the	Union’s	 furnace-room”,	
i.e.	Donbas,	or	the	“rocket	capital”,	meaning	Dnipropetrovsk,	was	





















































Iv. unIty and dIvISIonS In the maIdan  
(and beyond)
The	first	demonstrations	against	Yanukovych’s	decision	not	to	sign	








Yet	 as	 Kyiv’s	 Independence	 Square	 became	 the	 Euromaidan,	









cording	 to	sociological	 research	 from	December	2013,	people	aged	 15–29	ac-
counted	for	34%	of	the	group	‘on	permanent	duty’	in	the	Maidan,	and	those	
with	 university	 education	 (graduates	 and	 those	 still	 studying)	 were	 59%.	
Specialists	with	university	education	accounted	for	38%	and	students	10%.	It	
should	be	remembered,	though,	that	after	30	November	2013,	representatives	





























In	situations	of	 revolutionary	 tension,	 the	voices	of	 radicals	are	
particularly	 audible,	 hence	 the	nationalist	 slogans	 and	 symbols	
which	have	been	 conspicuous	 in	 the	Maidan.	However,	 the	na-











their	 significance	 is	 changing:	 they	 become	 diversities	 within	
one	 supreme	community,	 the	Nation,	understood	 in	 civil	 terms	
as	 a	 community	of	 all	 inhabitants	of	Ukraine.	The	 fact	 that	 the	
first	person	to	die	on	Hrushevsky	Street	was	an	Armenian	from	
Dnipropetrovsk,	 the	 second	 a	 first-generation	 immigrant	 from	
Belarus,	 and	 only	 the	 third	 a	Ukrainian	 from	western	Ukraine	
(who	was,	by	the	way,	a	professional	soldier	and	an	Iraq	veteran),	
is	a	symbolic	illustration	in	shorthand	of	this	new	quality.	







































tion	 buildings	 were	 undertaken	 by	 poorly	 organised	 groups	 of	
people	numbering	only	several	hundred	strong,	and	 in	Kharkiv	
and	Donetsk,	there	was	no-one	to	organise	even	that.	
But	 in	 that	 same	Donetsk,	 the	miners,	pensioners	 and	veterans	
of	the	Afghan	war	who	were	called	on	to	defend	public	buildings	
against	 an	 allegedly	 impending	 ‘invasion	 by	 the	 Right	 Sector’,	
carried	banners	with	slogans	about	the	indivisibility	of	Ukraine;	
for	them,	too,	splitting	the	country	was	out	of	the	question,	even	
though	 they	were	 concerned	 about	 certain	 other	 threats.22	 The	
small	 group	 that	 gathered	 in	 the	 Donetsk	 Euromaidan	was	 de-



















they	 agreed	 on	 a	 ceasefire;	 the	hostilities	 between	 clubs	had	 to	













































ture	Ukrainian	state.	Yet	during	 the	 independence	war	 in	 1917–
1921,	the	Ukrainian	People’s	Republic	was	established	as	a	unitary	
state	 (which	 formed	 a	 federation	 with	 the	 Western	 Ukrainian	















































or	 even	 granting	 broader	 powers	 to	 the	 local	 self-government	
(at	 that	 time	 the	 distinction	 between	 the	 two	 options	 was	 not	





and	 councils	 of	 people’s	 delegates	 (soviets).	 The	 latter	 problem	
was	solved	by	introducing	a	hierarchic	system	of	administration	






councils,	mostly	 from	 southern	 and	 eastern	 Ukraine,	 was	 held	




























autonomous	 republic,	 which	 would	 span	 one-third	 of	 Ukraine,	
from	Kharkiv	 to	Dnipropetrovsk	and	to	Odessa,	having	a	status	





However,	what	was	possible	 in	 the	 case	 of	Crimea	was	not	 fea-
sible	in	the	case	of	the	proposed	republic.	Granting	autonomy	to	










After	Yushchenko	 came	 to	 power,	 calls	 for	 autonomy	 subsided,	
and	after	Kushnaryov	died	in	2007,	the	Party	of	Regions	once	again	
became	 the	 party	 of	 a	 single	 region,	 representing	 the	 interests	
of	 the	Donetsk	Basin,	rather	 than	the	entire	eastern	and	south-






































































or	 in	 any	 case	 realistic,	 political	 project	 was	 at	 hand.	 Yaroslav	
Hrytsak	spoke	of	a	Russian	“plan	for	a	break-up	of	Ukraine”,	and	
accused	 the	 Presidential	 Administration	 chief	 Andriy	 Klyuyev,	
and	 thus	 indirectly	 Yanukovych	 himself,	 of	 implementing	 this	



















33	 Taras	 Chornovil,	 ‘Mene	 realno	 nudyt’	 vid	 zayav	 opozytsiynykh	 lideriv’,	





















The	 authors	 of	 this	 narrative,	 which	may	 indeed	 have	 been	 in-
vented	in	Moscow	or	in	Russophile	circles	in	Kyiv,	intended	it	to	
impede	any	resolution	of	the	current	crisis	and	the	emergence	of	








































parade’),	 at	 a	 time	of	 deep	 instability	 and	disorientation.	Today	









































phobia.	As	a	 result	 of	 the	 split,	Russia	would	also	 lose	 access	 to	
Transcarpathia,	where	it	holds	major	sway.	If	Ukraine	was	split	
into	 several	 parts	 (even	 if	 that	 went	 no	 further	 than	 real	 fed-
eralisation)	 this	would	 render	 it	difficult	 for	Moscow	 to	 combat	



































crisis,	 and	 after	 it	 collapsed,	 the	 potential	 for	 social	 discontent	
















mayor	 in	 a	 political	 rally,	 and	demanded	 self-rule	 for	 the	 city.38	
There	were	also	calls	for	the	city	to	join	Russia,	a	move	that	would	









































ple	 in	 the	 southern	 region	 would	 back	 the	 independence	 of	 their	 home	
oblast,	and	13%	would	favour	a	merger	with	another	oblast,	while	81%	and	
































The	Russian	 authorities	 and	 armed	 forces	 have	 actively	 backed	
those	 developments.	 However,	 regardless	 of	 how	 the	 situation	






































should	 introduce	 genuine	 regional	 self-governance	 with	 broad	
prerogatives,	instead	of	the	present	illusory	self-rule.	This	is	one	
of	the	challenges	facing	Ukraine.42	However,	no	solution	to	it	can	
be	found	or	implemented	amidst	the	revolutionary	heat.	
tadeuSz a. olSzańSkI
42	 For	more	information,	see	T.	Iwański,	P.	Żochowski,	op. cit.
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